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Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various 
aspects of people’s understandings of subjective experience based on their 
responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” 
but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people 
understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the 
standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes 
between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an 
experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test 
folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My 
findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial 
experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical 
conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of 
the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia 
that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather 
than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of 
consciousness. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Does an intelligent robot’s visual experience of red differ from it 
its experience of physical damage? One might say, “yes, of course. 
Otherwise how could it take different appropriate action in each case?” 
But many people might find the question senseless, because they do 
not believe that such a robot would have conscious experience at all. 
Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various 
aspects of people’s understandings of subjective experience based on 
their responses to questions about whether such robots “see red” or 
“feel frustrated,” but again, the intelligibility of such questions may 
well presuppose that people understand robots as capable of 
experience in the first place. The issue is that perhaps people 
intuitively carve up the world first and foremost not in terms of 
different (kinds of) mental states, but in terms of different (kinds of) 
entities: those entities that can have any experiences (experiencers); 
and those entities that cannot (nonexperiencers). If this is true—and 
robots are seen as not experiencing anything—then asking about 
perceived relative differences of mental states in robots is as 
meaningful as asking “is it more efficient for a pig to fly or breath 
underwater?” 
In this paper, I undertake to further explore how people 
understand subjective experience and test a standard methodological 
approach to subjective experience that assumes that robots and 
similar artifacts can be used unproblematically to test how people 
think about subjective experience. To this end, instead of taking 
experiential states as the fundamental thing to be investigated, I take 
experiencers themselves as the starting point. I begin from Sytsma 
and Machery’s (2010) results suggesting that philosophers and the folk 
have rather different conceptions of subjective experience. I offer new 
empirical results that further call into question the belief common 
among philosophers that there is intuitive, pre-theoretical warrant for 
thinking of a conscious experiencer in terms of qualitative or 
phenomenal states (qualia). In particular, I will argue for the following 
three claims: 
 
1. One of the standard ways intuitions about conscious experience 
have been tested, using attributions of mental states to simple 
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robots, is deeply problematic because it fails to take into 
account the more primitive concept of “an experiencer.” 
2. The folk do not think of conscious experience in terms of the 
standard philosophical conception of qualia/phenomenality, 
contrary to the assumptions of most philosophers and in 
keeping with Sytsma and Machery (2010). 
3. The folk do have a conception of the qualitative aspect of 
conscious experience that plays a role in their understanding of 
conscious experience, contrary to Sytsma and Machery, and this 
conception is distinct from the standard philosophical conception 
because it is grounded in the physical as opposed to the 
metaphysical. 
 
In section 2, I sketch recent work on subjective experience, 
focusing on Sytsma and Machery (2010). In section 3, I develop my 
own experimental framework and present my results in two parts with 
discussion in sections 4 (attributions of “experiencer”) and 5 (qualia 
and experiencers). The final section is a general discussion of the 
rationale, limitations, and implications of this study for accounts of 
subjective experience, qualia, and the “hard” problem of 
consciousness. 
 
2. Conceptions of Subjective Experience 
 
Philosophers most often theorize subjective experience in terms 
of qualitative or phenomenological mental states (qualia). Qualia are 
understood to be the “qualitative aspects” of conscious experience; if 
someone is seeing a stop sign, then the particular way the red appears 
in his/her phenomenological field is a red quale. There are qualia 
associated with all sense modalities and other states like emotions, 
moods, etc. Standard features of qualia include the following: they 
appear practically ineffable, non-relational, non-public, and 
immediately available to the subject. Consciousness and qualia are 
often run together. Chalmers (1995), in setting up his “hard problem” 
of consciousness, moves between Nagel’s (1974) “something it is like” 
notion of an experiencer and the notion of qualia. But it is not obvious 
that the problem of what makes an organism a subjective experiencer 
in Nagel’s sense and the problem of what makes a state a qualitative 
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state are so simply related. In recognition of this, experimental work 
focusing on how people actually understand subjective experience 
has emerged in the last few years. 
Such studies can be found in the work of Robbins and Jack 
(2006) on the conditions necessary for the folk to understand 
something as having subjective experience, or as they put it, taking 
the “phenomenological stance” toward the entity. Gray, Gray, and 
Wegner’s (2007) empirical study of “mind perception” involved a 
systematic examination of the factors involved in how people 
recognize minds in which they documented two major dimensions to 
such perception, “experience” (feeling pain, hunger, anger, etc.) and 
“agency” (self-control, memory, morality, etc.). They had participants 
compare a host of entities (e.g., frog, robot, God, infant, etc.) with 
respect to the entities’ capacity to have mental states and found that 
the states fell into natural groups along the dimensions of “experience” 
and “agency.” Also, Knobe and Prinz (2008) have studied how “the 
folk” understand subjective experience by analyzing how people 
differentially attribute phenomenological and non-phenomenological 
mental states to group agents (e.g., corporations); they argued that 
the unwillingness of people to attribute phenomenological states to 
group entities (in contrast to non-phenomenological states) indicate 
that the folk recognize such a difference. But none of these studies 
target precisely subjective experience in the broad sense of 
“phenomenality” or the general qualitative nature of subjective 
experience. Robbins and Jack (2006), with their focus on “hedonic 
value,” miss the most general sense of subjective experience because 
they do not include in their study the mundane subjective aspects of 
perceptual states lacking in hedonic value, e.g., the particular way the 
brown color of the bricks appears to me or the particular way the hum 
of traffic in the background sounds. Similarly, Gray et al. (2007), while 
using the term “experience” in their study, do not use it in the 
philosophical sense of general subjective experience because they do 
not include perceptual experience in their sense of it. Finally, Knobe 
and Prinz (2008) do actually target subjective experience in its most 
general phenomenal sense, but their choice to use in their study 
collective entities like corporations, which can be shown to differ 
functionally and behaviorally from individuals, confounds their 
conclusions. I refer the reader to Sytsma and Machery (2009; 2010, 
pp. 302–305) for further critical details. In what follows, Iwill make 
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primary use of the critical framework of Sytsma and Machery (2010; 
henceforth “S&M”) to contextualize and motivate this study, since they 
do indeed address the question of subjective experience in its most 
general sense.1 
S&M set out explicitly to examine whether the “folk 
understanding” of subjective experience has been “read off” 
successfully by philosophers. S&M point out the pervasive 
philosophical assumption of a deep link between subjective experience 
and phenomenality. They write in the first sentence of their first 
section, “for most contemporary philosophers, subjective experience is 
characterized by its phenomenality” (2010, p. 300). S&M’s approach 
involves finding experimental settings that cleave between the 
“philosophical” conception and a distinctive folk conception. S&M 
make use of a robot/human vignette as the backbone of their 
experiment, analyzing the differential patterns of the attribution of 
mental states by the participants to the vignette’s main character, 
either a robot or a human. The independent variables were (1) 
whether the main character in the vignette was a human or robot and, 
(2) which mental state they were asked to attribute (or not) to the 
main character. 
In the first of their three studies, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four vignettes varying the subject between 
human/robot (H or R), and varying the mental state between seeing 
red/feeling pain (SR or FP). In the first version, the robot named 
Jimmy (or human named Timmy) is instructed to move a red box from 
a group of variously colored boxes. After it/he successfully moves the 
box, participants were asked whether Jimmy/Timmy “saw red.” In the 
second version, Jimmy/Timmy would again be instructed to move the 
red box but would receive an electrical shock after picking up the box, 
immediately drop the box, and move quickly away from it. Participants 
were then asked whether Jimmy/Timmy “felt pain.” Participants 
answered the question with a number on a seven-point scale with 1 ¼ 
clearly no, 4 ¼ not sure, and 7 ¼ clearly yes. The participants were 
also pre-screened to determine whether they were philosophers (had 
graduate training or were majoring in philosophy), and the results 
were further broken down by the division of participants into 
philosophers and non-philosophers. This constituted a test of the 
hypothesis that non-philosophers and philosophers both conceive of 
conscious experience (at least implicitly) in phenomenological terms, 
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the rationale being that for those thinking in terms of 
phenomenological consciousness, the attribution of perceptual 
experience (red) and bodily sensation (pain) would go together. While 
the prediction for philosophers was borne out, it was not for non-
philosophers; there was a significant difference in that non-
philosophers were willing to attribute “seeing red” to the robot and 
philosophers were not. Neither group attributed “feeling pain” to the 
robot, and they both attributed both pain and seeing red to the 
human. These results suggest to S&M that “ordinary folk” conceive of 
subjective experience differently from philosophers. 
In the second study, S&M proposed to test (and ultimately 
reject) a putative explanation of the attribution behavior of the non-
philosophers that avoided the conclusion that the difference was due 
to non-philosophers not recognizing the phenomenological features of 
experience. The alternative explanation is that there is a relevant 
difference between internal senses (pain, emotions, etc.) and external 
senses (perceptual experience), and that the non-philosophers were 
willing to attribute external senses (seeing red) to the robot, and not 
internal ones (feeling pain), but nonetheless understood sensing 
phenomenally. In this experiment, participants were again divided into 
four groups; the scenarios were modified to be about moving a box of 
bananas (detecting it by odor from boxes of other distinctively smelly 
things), and the robot/person was either successful or frustrated in 
moving the box. Participants were asked whether the person/robot 
smelled bananas in the successful scenarios and whether the 
person/robot felt angry in the frustrating scenarios. If the internal/ 
external hypothesis were correct then the non-philosophers should be 
willing to attribute smelling bananas to the robot (like they did with 
“seeing red”), but not with “feeling anger.” The results did not bear 
this out: “smelling bananas” was neither attributed (nor denied) to the 
robot. The participants seemed ambivalent and divided as to whether 
to attribute “smelling” to the robot. Thus the results were interpreted 
as refuting the claim that the internal/external sense hypothesis 
governed attributions. One possibility S&M acknowledge is that sense 
modalities could vary in how external they are (e.g., vision being very 
external and smelling less external), and thus a refined 
internal/external hypothesis, one that recognizes sense modalities as 
varying between more internal and less internal, might still be 
consistent with the results. 
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In the final study, S&M introduce a factor that they suggest 
does explain the preceding attribution behavior, namely that mental 
states with an “affective valence” (states that one either wants to be in 
or wants to avoid being in) are ones that are associated with 
subjective experience. As S&M put it, “we hypothesize that it is not 
whether a mental state is the product of the external senses that 
matters for the folk understanding of subjective experience, but 
whether they associate that state with some hedonic value for the 
subject” (2010, pp. 314–315). To test this positive account (and rule 
out the refined internal/external hypothesis), they ran a similar 
scenario test with a robot/human and three different olfactory cues: 
familiar pleasant (banana); familiar unpleasant (vomit); and unfamiliar 
and presumably valence neutral (isoamyl acetate). Again, the results 
indicated that the participants were willing to ascribe all smells to the 
human, but only the unfamiliar cue (isoamyl acetate) to the robot. The 
scores for attributing familiar smells to the robot were not significantly 
different from “not sure,” so while participants failed to attribute 
familiar smells to the robot, neither did they deny that the robot 
smelled the familiar objects. S&M argue that these results favor their 
valence proposal over the alternative interior/exterior distance 
proposal, because their valence account predicts the observed 
response pattern, which falls along different valence lines. The 
alternative hypothesis cannot explain the difference because the 
smells were all from the same sense modality and hence did not 
involve any difference in the “interior distance.” 
S&M view the results of their studies as constituting preliminary 
evidence that phenomenality does not figure into how non-
philosophers attribute states like seeing color, hearing a sound, feeling 
a pain, etc. In their final section, S&M argue that since non-
philosophers do not recognize these diverse mental states as united by 
having phenomenological properties, it follows that phenomenological 
experience cannot be taken to be the manifestly obvious feature of our 
mental life that the philosophers pushing the “hard problem” of 
consciousness need it to be (2010, p. 321). S&M are advancing an 
important skeptical line against the “hard problem.” In particular, they 
have raised serious doubts about whether non-philosophers have the 
same conception of phenomenality that philosophers do. There are, 
however, several problematic aspects of their study that threaten to 
undermine the support for their conclusion.2 
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The first concern is that asking participants to attribute mental 
states to the robot character might not be an effective way to test 
attribution behavior. Robots and other artifacts like computers and 
artificial intelligence may from the start embody, for us, a certain 
“valence” in that they produce in us an aversive feeling of uncanniness 
when presented as experiencers. Gray and Wegner (2012) have 
documented an “uncanniness” effect of just this kind: machines that 
appear to experience states like pain, hunger, fear, and other 
emotions strike people as uncanny. S&M suggest that the link between 
subjective experience and phenomenality “only becomes obvious as 
one is trained into a particular way of thinking about the mind” (2010, 
p. 323); I suspect that such training also obviates our natural sense of 
“uncanniness” and explains why philosophers’ intuitions seem to point 
in different directions. I return to this below, but the upshot is that for 
some reason, one certainly worth exploring, the folk begin with rather 
deep and pervasive intuitions that artifacts (as opposed to “natural” 
life) categorically cannot be experiencers and that this governs their 
attribution behavior. 
A further concern is that S&M’s approach does not push the 
empirical questioning back quite far enough. Their results, though 
preliminary, do seem to provide serious reason to doubt the intuitive 
grounding of the received philosophical treatment of subjective 
experience in terms of phenomenality. But while the folk may not 
conceive of subjective experience in phenomenological terms, 
understood in the usual philosophical way, it is moving too quickly to 
dismiss altogether a phenomenological component in mental state 
attribution. Putting “phenomenality” to more direct empirical test is 
called for to shed light on the folk conceptual dynamics around 
subjective and qualitative experience. 
Finally, note that S&M use what might be termed an “indirect” 
approach to test how the folk think of subjective experience: they test 
the willingness of participants to attribute various mental states, which 
we assume include phenomenality or other subjective features of 
interest, to a robot and then “infer” to the best explanation of the 
attribution behavior in terms of the participants’ conceptual scheme 
regarding subjective experience. This approach is indirect in that it 
requires inference back from attribution tendencies to how the 
participants are conceiving of things in order to explain the attribution 
behavior. It has the virtue of not depending on the participant’s ability 
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to articulate implicit understandings that govern their attribution 
behavior, and of course, is less susceptible to the bias that may occur 
with more direct approaches. I will argue below, however, that utilizing 
a more direct approach has its own distinct advantages. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
Departing from S&M, the theoretical framework in this study 
centers on the notion of “being an experiencer” at a creature level 
rather than on experiential mental states. The explanandum is 
subjective conscious experience, understood in Nagel’s “something it 
is like” (SIL) sense. An entity is an experiencer when there is 
“something it is like” to be that entity. I depart from S&M in that I do 
not collapse being an experiencer (having SIL) into having a particular 
mental state (or set of states) with the second-order property of 
“there being something it is like to have it.” For purposes here, the 
reigning philosophical account of qualia as the phenomenological 
properties of mental states is taken as a starting point, and the central 
question is the extent to which folk conceptions agree with this 
account. (I move back and forth between the terms “qualia” and 
“phenomenality,” depending on context, with the understanding that 
qualia are the phenomenological properties of mental states.) 
The research questions for this study are (1) the ways in which 
the application of the notion of “being an experiencer” in Nagel’s SIL 
sense depend on psychological, biological, behavioral, or 
computational factors of the putative experiencer, and (2) 
whether/how subjects make use of a concept of qualia in attributing 
“being an experiencer.” The study itself involved a series of questions 
in two parts, the first exploring how subjects attribute “being an 
experiencer” and the second probing their understanding of qualia and 
the extent to which it affects their attributing “being an experiencer.” 
In part 1, participants were asked to assign a degree of confidence to 
whether various entities are experiencers, and in part 2, participants 
were asked degree of confidence questions concerning being an 
experiencer in situations in which qualia and other related factors were 
manipulated. Instructions were designed to attune subjects to the 
anchoring cases for “being an experiencer,” namely the sense of being 
an experiencer we have from our own case on one end, and on the 
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other end, simple artifacts generally understood to be lacking inner 
experience. 
 
4. Experimental Study Part 1: Attributing “Being 
an Experiencer” 
 
This first part of the study tested the attribution behavior of 
subjects with respect to particular kinds of entities. It was designed to 
test both whether the two anchoring cases in the instructions were 
comprehensible to participants, and also what factors play a role in 
how “being an experiencer” is employed by participants. 
 
4.1. Participants 
 
Participants (N ¼ 73) were university students drawn from 
three sections of an informal logic class taught by the same instructor. 
The philosophical content of the course is minimal. The gender 
breakdown was 47% (34) male, 53% (39) female. 
 
4.2. Materials and Procedures 
 
Participants completed a questionnaire at the beginning of a 
class. The instructor administered the questionnaire and was not 
informed of the research questions. The participants were given the 
following prompt: 
 
As we all know, each of us as conscious human beings have an 
“inner life.” We are aware of things going on around us and 
inside our minds. In other words, there is something it is like to 
be each of us at any given moment: the sum total of what we 
are sensing, thinking, feeling, etc. We are experiencers. 
 
On the other hand, things like thermostats, burglar alarms, and 
bread machines do not have an inner life: there is not anything 
it is like to be these objects, despite the fact that they can 
monitor conditions around them and make appropriate things 
happen at appropriate times. They are not experiencers. 
 
They were then presented with a list of twenty items and asked 
to indicate, for each item, whether that item was an experiencer using 
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a seven-point Likert scale anchored with 1 ¼ clearly not an 
experiencer, 7 ¼ clearly an experiencer, and 4 ¼ unsure. The 
twenty items they evaluated were: 
 
1. a person in coma _________. 
2. a virus _________. 
3. Spock (from Star Trek) _________. 
4. seaweed _________. 
5. Helen Keller (when alive) _________. 
6. a complicated computerized surveillance system visually 
monitoring a house and also monitoring the sounds, 
temperature, and odors in order to detect intruders or 
environmental changes and correct them _________. 
7. C3PO (from Star Wars) _________. 
8. a dead person _________. 
9. the Statue of Liberty _________. 
10. a computer program exactly simulating the behavior of your 
neurons _________. 
11. a dolphin _________. 
12. your best friend _________. 
13. a computer _________. 
14. Data (from Star Trek) _________. 
15. Bambi _________. 
16. a human embryo _________. 
17. God _________. 
18. a computer program exactly simulating the behavior of your 
eurons in a robot _________. 
19. R2D2 (from Star Wars) _________. 
20. a person under general anesthesia _________. 
 
Participants were also instructed to explain their responses if 
necessary. 
 
4.3. Results and Discussion 
 
The mean values and standard deviations for the twenty items 
are reported in table 1. Results are graphed with a 99% confidence 
interval in figure 1. Table 1 contains the results of a one-sample t-test 
for each of the items testing the null hypothesis that the mean equals 
4 (the “unsure” response). The t-tests provide rough indication of 
which entities were considered experiencers. In all the tests but one 
the results were significant at p, 0.001; the test for the entity Spock 
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was significant at p, 0.01. As a result, 9 of the 20 entities were ranked 
as experiencers and 11 were ranked as nonexperiencers; 
there were no entities with a mean response of “unsure.” 
In descending order of means, the experiencers were: your best 
friend; Helen Keller; dolphin; God; person under general anesthesia; 
Bambi; human embryo; Spock; and person in coma. The entities 
identified as non-experiencers (again in descending order of means) 
were: C3PO; Data; seaweed; R2D2; a virus; a computer simulation of 
your brain in a robot; a computer simulation of your brain; a 
computerized house surveillance system; a computer; a dead person; 
and the Statue of Liberty. 
The mean scores for the twenty items were tested using an 
ANOVA with repeated measures and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
(Mauchly’s Sphericity test was significant; p, 0.001, x2 ¼ 656(189), e 
¼ 0.448). The mean scores for being an experiencer were statistically 
significantly different; F(8.51, 536) ¼ 122, p , 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.659. A 
Bonferroni adjustment for all 190 multiple pairwise comparisons would 
have involved an excessive loss of power (aB ¼ 0.05/190, 0.0003), so 
instead a False Detection Rate method (FDR) was employed with aBY 
¼ 0.007 used for post-hoc comparisons (see table 2).3 Three discrete 
breaks occurred (a) between best friend (the experiencer with the 
highest mean) and Helen Keller; (b) between the experiencer with 
the lowest mean (person in coma) and the non-experiencer with the 
highest mean (C3P0), naturally dividing the experiencers from the 
non-experiencers; and (c) between the virus and the robot with a 
computer brain simulation. Thus a natural partition using the FDR 
subsets involves subsets 1, 2 þ 3, 5, 6, 7 þ the Statue of Liberty. In 
this partition, the first subset consists of the anchoring case (best 
friend), the second subset of slightly more complicated people or 
people-like entities (higher animals, anesthetized and impaired people, 
God), the third subset of marginal experiencers (fictional animals and 
aliens, embryo, person in coma), the fourth subset of the high non-
experiencers (fictional anthropomorphized robots, virus, seaweed), 
and finally in the fifth subset were the low non-experiencers (explicitly 
computerized items, corpse, Statue of Liberty). 
A Principle Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to 
transform the original variables onto uncorrelated components to 
simplify the data structure, eliminate redundant and unreliable 
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descriptors, and reveal interpretable factors. The relatively low sample 
size (N ¼ 73) in this study indicated that the number of variables (20) 
ought to be reduced to 12 or 13 so that the standard ratio of 5:1 for 
sample size to variable be maintained. Only 3 of the 20 items failed to 
correlate at least 0.3 with at least one other item (embryo, God, 
corpse) indicating factorability. Individual measures of sampling 
adequacy on the full 20 variables indicated four variables with low 
(,0.5) measures: corpse; dolphin; God; and embryo. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.689, below the 
target value of 0.7, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (x2 
(190) ¼ 546, p, 0.001). 
After removing the four variables with low sampling adequacy, 
the PCA method was used and six components converged with 
eigenvalues. 1, explaining 68% of the total variance. Inspection of the 
component matrix indicated that one component depended on only the 
two variables with most extreme means and smallest variances (best 
friend, Statue of Liberty) and one component on only one variable 
(Helen Keller). After removing these three variables and extracting 
four components, the rotated component matrix revealed one variable 
(computerized house) with non-zero loadings on more than two 
components; this variable was removed. The resultant extraction 
consisting of the four components explaining 73% of the variance was 
rotated (Varimax with Kaiser Normalization) so that the rotated factors 
cumulatively explained 28%, 16%, 14%, and 14% of the total 
variance, respectively. In the final extraction, all individual variable 
adequacy scores were above 0.5, the group Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
sampling adequacy score was above 0.7, and all the communalities 
were above 0.5. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was again significant (x2 
(66) ¼ 363, p, 0.001). The rotated component matrix revealed the 
near simple structure shown in table 3. 
The first and primary component should be interpreted as 
whether the entity in question is an artifact, as it loaded on all and 
only the artifact variables. The second component loaded significantly 
(jxj . 0.5) on the two “incapacitated” humans variables, but 
interestingly, also saliently (0.4 # jxj , 0.5) in the opposite direction 
(negatively) on the two variables for computerized human brain/body) 
simulations. This result is suggestive of Gray and Wegner’s (2012) 
uncanniness findings: humans who lack importantly human qualities 
and artifacts that appear to have such qualities strike people as 
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uncanny. Accordingly, component 2 can be interpreted as a measure 
of uncanniness in roughly this sense.4 The third component loaded 
significantly on nonhuman living entities (seaweed and virus), and 
next (though not saliently) on Bambi. Finally, the fourth component 
loaded significantly on Spock and Bambi and seemed interpretable as 
a measure of human-likeness or anthropomorphicity. The internal 
consistency for the four factors was tested using Cronbach’s alpha. The 
descriptive statistics for the components, Artifact (N ¼ 6, M ¼ 2.35, 
SD ¼ 1.26, a ¼ 0.85), Uncanniness (N ¼ 2, M ¼ 5.21, SD ¼ 1.34, a 
¼ 0.74), Living (N ¼ 2, M ¼ 2.79, SD ¼ 1.52, a ¼ 0.71), and 
Anthropomorphic (N ¼ 2, M ¼ 4.94, SD ¼ 1.91, a ¼ 0.74) indicated 
“good” internal consistency. 
The results indicate that the assumptions behind the anchoring 
cases of being an experiencer matched the participants’ own 
understanding: the significantly highest/lowest mean answers and 
lowest standard deviations were for “best friend” and “Statue of 
Liberty,” as predicted. Further indication that the participants’ 
understanding of “being an experiencer” fit well with Nagel’s 
“something it is like” articulation is that in addition to ordinary and 
variously incapacitated people, animals too were readily accorded 
“experiencer” status, while at the other end, dead people and artificial 
entities described as “computers” are clearly not conceived of as 
experiencers in this sense. Fictional aliens, fictional anthropomorphized 
intelligent robots, embryos, people in comas, viruses, and seaweed 
were less conclusively non-experiencers. 
 
5. Experimental Study Part 2: Qualia and “Being 
an Experiencer” 
 
The second part of study probed how the concept of qualia is 
related to attributions of experiencer. In particular, it attempted to 
investigate whether subjects employ the notion of qualia and if so, 
what sense of qualia subjects employ, and how the absence or 
attenuation of qualia affects their willingness to attribute “being an 
experiencer.” 
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5.1. Participants 
 
The participants consisted of the same university students (N ¼ 
73) drawn from three sections of an informal logic class taught by the 
same instructor; the second part of the study was conducted during 
the same session as the first. 
 
5.2. Materials and Procedures 
 
Participants completed a second questionnaire immediately 
following the first. Again, the instructor administered the questionnaire 
and was not informed of the research questions. The prompt and 
questions themselves from part 1 were intended to further attune 
participants to the notion of being an experiencer in Nagel’s sense. The 
term ‘qualia’ was not defined directly nor used in any of the questions. 
Participants were simply given the following directions: 
 
Please answer the following questions using the scale below. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
|   |   | 
certainly not not sure certainly so 
 
 
They were then asked ten questions (several requiring two 
responses). All but the last one involved utilizing the above Likert 
scale; question 10 required a written response. Two of the questions 
were asked in two different ways (questions 2 and 7). The ten 
questions in order were: 
 
1. Imagine a medical procedure that would remove your inner experience 
without affecting your brain, so from the outside you would remain 
unchanged physically and behaviorally. Do you think such a procedure is 
possible? ________. 
2. [Version A] Could a robot EVER feel anxious? _________. 
[Version B] Could a robot EVER be anxious? _________. [Bold emphasis 
indicates difference in versions.] 
3. Can we ever be sure that you see red the way another person 
does?_________. 
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4. Imagine a person who feels no sense of guilt or right or wrong about any 
actions whatsoever.  
Is such an entity possible? _________. 
Would such a person be an experiencer? _________. 
5. Imagine a person without any emotions whatsoever. 
Is such an entity possible? _________. 
Would such a person be an experiencer? _________. 
6. Imagine that a completely color blind person got an implant that encoded 
colors in her visual field with numbers indicating colors, so for example, 
the sky on a clear day was indicated with a number 1 to indicate blue.  
Would such a person be able to see blue? _________. 
7. [Version A] Imagine another kind of intelligent creature (from a 
society much like ours) whose experience didn’t consist of the 
subjective feels, tastes, colors, sounds, etc., but rather of objective 
measurements of pressure, direction, chemical composition, light 
frequency, physically helpful/harmful environmental factors, etc. [Bold 
emphasis indicates difference in versions.] 
[Version B] Imagine an intelligent robot whose experience didn’t consist 
of the subjective feels, tastes, colors, sounds, etc., but rather of objective 
measurements of pressure, direction, chemical composition, light 
frequency, physically helpful/harmful environmental factors, etc. [Bold 
emphasis indicates difference in versions.] 
Is such an entity possible? _________. 
Would such an entity be an experiencer? _________. 
8. Imagine a person physically and behaviorally identical to you in all ways 
but who had no inner experience at all. 
Is such a person possible? _________. 
Would such an entity be an experiencer? _________. 
9. Imagine a person whose senses were destroyed by disease, but who had 
been given artificial senses that reported directly to their speech center 
things like “wall up ahead” or “bird singing ten feet to right.” 
Would such an entity be an experiencer? _________. 
10. Imagine that Dan, a professional coffee taster for years, has recently 
begun to fail competency tests that he used to pass all the time. He has 
begun to confuse coffee type X with coffee type Y, and vice versa. For him 
coffee type X now tastes just like coffee type Y used to and vice versa. List 
all the explanations you can think of that might explain this. (Continue on 
back if necessary.) 
 
Participants were randomly assigned version A (N ¼ 36) or B (N ¼ 37) 
of the instrument that corresponded to the versions of questions 2 and 
7 indicated above. The two versions of question 2 simply varied in the 
wording of whether a robot could “EVER feel anxious” (version A) or 
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“EVER be anxious” (version B).5 On question 7, the feature that varied 
was whether the entity was an “intelligent creature (from a society 
much like ours)” (version A) or whether the entity was “an intelligent 
robot” (version B).6 
 
5.3. Results and Discussion 
 
The mean values and standard deviations for questions 1–9 
from part 2 are given in table 4, and graphical results with a 99% 
confidence interval are given in figure 2. Table 4 also contains the 
results of a one-sample t-test for each of the items testing the null 
hypothesis that the mean equals 4 (the “unsure” response). Again, the 
t-tests provide rough indication of whether the mean response 
indicates an affirmative, negative, or unsure answer. 
The absent qualia/zombie questions 1 (M ¼ 2.30, SD ¼ 1.60) 
and 8a (M ¼ 2.55, SD ¼ 1.78) indicate that non-philosophers do not 
think such cases are possible, as the means differed significantly from 
the “unsure” level 4, with t(72) ¼ 29.09, p , 0.001, d ¼ 1.06 for 
question 1 and t(72) ¼ 26.97, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.82 for question 8a. 
The question exploring intuitions about having a sense of guilt and 
right/wrong (question 4b, M ¼ 5.25, SD ¼ 1.85) indicated that such a 
sense is not taken as necessary for being an experiencer, t(72) ¼ 
5.77, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.67. 
On the other hand, having emotions seems to neatly divide non-
philosophers: the responses indicated “unsure” (question 5a: M ¼ 
3.73, SD ¼ 2.31; 5b: M ¼ 4.00, SD ¼ 2.24) with both means failing 
to differ significantly from the level of 4. The frequencies of responses 
for whether such a person would be an experiencer further bear out 
this uncertainty, i.e., 44% indicating “no,” 41% indicating “yes,” and 
15% “unsure.” The numbers were similar for whether these persons 
are possible. Question 3, which asked whether we could be sure 
another person sees red the way we do (M ¼ 3.07, SD ¼ 2.00), 
indicated that participants do not think one could be sure that red 
things appear the same to everyone; t(70) ¼ 23.91, p , 0.001, d ¼ 
0.46. The questions concerning unusual sensory qualia (questions 6 
and 9) split in an interesting way. Question 6, concerning whether a 
color blind person with 1’s in his/her visual field indicating blue could 
“see blue,” indicated that non-philosophers thought “no” (M ¼ 3.00, 
SD ¼ 1.97 with t(71) ¼ 24.30, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.51). Yet with respect 
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to whether a person whose sense modalities were wired directly to 
their speech centers (question 9, M ¼ 4.75, SD ¼ 1.88), the 
consensus was that the person would be an experiencer, t(72) ¼ 3.42, 
p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.40. Thus folk attribution of sensory experience does 
seem to require a qualitative aspect in order to phenomenologically 
“see” as opposed to informationally “detect” blue. 
The mean scores for the ten version-independent items (1, 3, 
4a& b, 5a & b, 6, 8a & b, 9) were also tested using a one-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Mauchly’s Sphericity test indicated the 
assumption of sphericity was violated, x2(44) ¼ 122.2, p , 0.001, so 
a Greenhouse-Geisser correction of e ¼ 0.732 was used. The ANOVA 
shows that the mean scores are significantly different; F(6.59, 454.6) 
¼ 33.4, p , 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.326. A Bonferroni adjustment for the 45 
multiple pairwise comparisons was used for post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons with aB ¼ 0.05 / 45 ¼ 0.00111. Comparisons of 
particular interest were among the six parallel questions asking about 
the possibility and experiencer status of a person without a sense of 
guilt (4a, 4b), a person without any emotions (5a, 5b), and a person 
identical to the participant but without inner experience (8a, 8b); the 
results indicated no significant difference between the means of the 
possibility and experiencer status of each of these pairs, and each of 
the means for the possibilities were mutually significantly different (4a 
– 5a – 8a), as were the means for the experiencer status (4b – 5b – 
8b). The two absent qualia/zombie possibility questions (1, 8a) 
showed no significant difference from each other, and both differed 
significantly from the means for the emotionless experiencer question 
(5a, 5b), which again did not differ significantly from the unsure 
response level of 4. 
The results for the version-dependent questions (2, 7p, and 7e) 
are also given in table 4 and the results are graphed with a 99% 
confidence interval in figure 3. Table 4 also contains the results of a 
one-sample t-test for each version (A and B) of the three items (total 
of six), testing the null hypothesis that the mean equals 4 (the 
“unsure” response). In terms of the rough direction of the responses, 
both versions of the “robot being anxious” question (2) had means 
indicating “no” (A: M ¼ 2.86, SD ¼ 2.00; B: M ¼ 2.41, SD ¼ 1.82) as 
t-tests were significant; A: t(35) ¼ 23.41, p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.57; B: t(36) 
¼ 25.34, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.88. In contrast, both versions of the 
possibility of an “objective experiencer” question (7e) had means 
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indicating “yes” (A: M ¼ 4.86, SD ¼ 1.61; B: M ¼ 5.16, SD ¼ 2.06); 
t-tests were again significant; A: t(35) ¼ 3.22, p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.54; B: 
t(36) ¼ 3.43, p , 0.01, d ¼ 0.56. Finally, an interesting divergence 
was found in the means of the experiencer status question (7e) of the 
difference versions of the “objective experiencer.” The means for the 
intelligent creature version (A: M ¼ 5.08, SD ¼ 1.86) and the 
intelligent robot version (B: M ¼ 2.70, SD ¼ 1.70) were significantly 
different from the “unsure” response (A: t (35) ¼ 3.450, p , 0.01, d ¼ 
0.58; B: t(36) ¼ 24.65, p , 0.001, d ¼ 0.76), but in opposite 
directions: the creature was understood to be an experiencer and the 
robot as a non-experiencer. 
An analysis of variance showed that, indeed, there was a 
significant effect due to the kind of intelligent entity (A: natural 
“creature” versus B: artificial “robot”) for whether it was considered an 
experiencer in question 7e; F(1,71) ¼ 32.7, p , 0.001, h2 ¼ 0.315 
(Levene’s Test indicated equal variances; F ¼ 0.002, p ¼ 0.96). The 
ANOVA found no effect due to kind of entity on the possibility of 
experience (7p), F(1,71) ¼ 0.483, p ¼ 0.49, h2 ¼ 0.006, with 
Levene’s Test non-significant at F ¼ 3.09, p ¼ 0.08. Finally, in 
keeping with S&M’s results, there was not a significant difference 
between the 
wordings (being anxious or feeling anxious) in question 2, F(1,71) ¼ 
1.04, p ¼ 0.31, h2 ¼ 0.014, and Levene’s Test non-significant at F ¼ 
0.69, p ¼ 0.41. 
The final question, a variation of Dennett’s (1988) Chase and 
Sandborn coffee taster “intuition pump,” tested per S&M’s (2010, p. 
323) suggestion whether non-philosophers might be readily nudged 
into recognizing a perhaps latent conception of qualia. In it, 
participants were asked to list all possible explanations for the coffee 
taster’s “interchanged qualia.” The 123 responses offered were 
categorized into 15 groups with results in table 5 and figure 4. 
The vast majority (111, 90.2%) of all responses fell into one of 
the following four non-phenomenological categories: taste bud issues 
(explanation types 1, 2, 3, 4); old age/disease (explanation types 7, 
8); brain/nerve damage (explanation type 10); and too used to the 
taste (explanation type 9). There were only seven (5.7%) of the 123 
explanations that offered reasonably clear phenomenological 
responses; these explanations fell into three types (11, 12, 13): the 
memory of the taste changed (two participants); the perception of the 
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taste changed (one participant); and altered inner experience (four 
participants). Notably, five of the seven responders offering a 
phenomenological explanation had indicated that they had at least one 
prior philosophy class. Finally, there were four responses (4%) of self-
deception/doubt (explanation types 5, 6) that one could possibly 
interpret as phenomenological. Especially given that the previous 
questions and prompts in the experiment asked participants 
repeatedly to think about “inner experience” and its variability, this 
direct approach to awaking putative latent intuitions concerning qualia/ 
phenomenality provided no evidence that any such latent concepts 
exist. 
 
6. General Discussion 
 
In this section, I discuss the rationale for the experimental 
framework (section 6.1), the implications of the results for 
experimental methodology and general understanding of putative 
“artificial experiencers” (section 6.2), the relationship between 
conscious subjective experience and qualia (section 6.3), limitations of 
the study (section 6.4), and implications for the “hard” problem of 
consciousness (section 6.5). 
 
6.1. Theoretical Framework: Direct versus Indirect 
Design 
 
Part of the experimental design involves assessing subjects’ 
direct responses. For example, the participants in the study were 
asked to assign a degree of certainty to whether an entity under 
consideration is an experiencer. This direct approach, employing from 
the start the notion of an experiencer as it does, can be thought of as 
“front loading” a concept. However, no contentious philosophical 
assumptions were made about it; the experiment simply explores the 
commonly held notion that certain things are experiencers and others 
are not. 
A natural concern when one attempts experimentally to test 
direct responses is bias. The problem of bias in experiments with direct 
questions may come up in various ways, including in particular 
demand characteristics, the experimental artifact introduced 
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when participants behave out of a perhaps implicit and unconscious 
interpretation of the purpose of the experiment. Another possible 
source arises from the difference between the employment of a 
concept and making judgments about such employment. 
In this setting, however, it is not clear that demand characteristic bias 
will be a factor since the questions do not concern “socially loaded” 
areas like sexual practice, drug use, or racial attitudes in which 
demand bias is clearly a concern.7 Similarly, while a dualprocess 
background hypothesis might suggest that a higher-level report is 
distorting the lower-level process of interest, given that this study’s 
interest is not necessarily in such low-level processes, this sort of bias 
is not a clear concern either. 
This is not to say there is not the possibility for bias arising out 
of the explicit structure of part of the experiment, but rather that the 
likelihood is not a great concern here because (1) low-level distortions 
from a dual process situation are not particularly germane since the 
target is a higher conceptual dynamic, and (2) demand characteristics, 
which typically play out in attitudinal studies with a social expectation 
valence, are not clearly indicated because the topics involved are not 
generally socially contentious. It was not feasible to implement a post-
experimental questionnaire, which is a standard technique to test for 
demand characteristics. I did, however, employ a measure to counter 
such bias: the administrator of the experiment was not informed of the 
research hypothesis or topic. 
There is a complementary concern when one attempts 
experimentally to test attribution behavior with a concept like 
“experiencer,” namely, that subjects may simply lack an 
understanding of the concepts required (subjective experience, qualia, 
etc.) to make responses meaningful. But in this case, concern about 
subjects not having the requisite concepts may be obviated by the fact 
that the central concepts involved are indeed highly recognizable by 
the folk, namely the “how colors look to each of us” sense of qualia 
and the “something it is like to be” sense of an experiencer. And as 
anyone who has taught these concepts in philosophy or psychology 
can attest—there is enough of an understanding in the folk of the 
“what it is like to see red” notion to immediately grasp the 
epistemological conundrum to which it gives rise. What is more, the 
case at hand is different from cases like asking subjects whether 
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there can be truths in math that cannot be proven or whether the 
largest prime number is odd or even.8 Of course, in such cases one 
may not conclude much of anything about whether the folk agree with 
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem or Euclid’s proof that there are an 
infinite number of primes. But this study targets how folk 
understandings of a relatively ordinary concept (not precisely defined 
terms like even, odd, prime, proof, or truth) compare with “expert” 
understandings of these same ordinary phenomena, not results 
deduced from propositions about these phenomena. In asking 
participants to employ their concept of “how red looks” to novel and 
unusual situations, the understanding is that how they apply it will 
shed light on its contours as a folk concept, not whether they actually 
disagree with Jackson’s Mary argument. 
 
6.2. Artificial Experiencers 
 
The results from parts 1 and 2 make a clear case for a 
categorical resistance in the folk to attributing experiencer status to an 
“artificial entity.” Participants in part 1 were not just less inclined to 
rank “artificial” beings as experiencers than they were people and 
animals, but also less than very “low” life forms. Indeed, the results 
suggest a categorical refusal to consider as an experiencer any kind of 
“artificial” being (computer, robot with an exact simulation of a brain 
for its “brain,” android, etc.). No “artificial” entity even received a “not 
sure” score for experiencer. The highest mean for such an entity was 
for the fictional character C3PO (M ¼ 3.21). The mean score for the 
old philosophical standby—a robot with an exact simulation (neuron for 
neuron) of a human brain for its “brain”—was significantly lower than 
that of a virus. 
The results of the PCA from part 1 indicate that the largest 
factor in attributing experiencer status is whether the entity is an 
artifact. But the second factor, the uncanniness component, also 
contributes to a further categorical consideration against artifacts as 
experiencers. Gray and Wegner’s (2012) uncanny valley documented 
uncanniness on two poles: on one end, artifacts possessing typical 
experiential responsiveness; and on the other end, though less 
strongly, humans lacking typical experiential responsiveness. The 
uncanniness found here worked in different directions on each end; it 
effectively “changed signs” from one end to the other. Being uncanny 
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in the direction of humanlike artifacts worked against attributing 
experience (negative loads) and being uncanny in the other direction 
of unresponsive humans worked in favor of attributing experience 
(positive loads). Thus, uncanniness worked against attributing 
experience only in the direction of artifacts. 
Even when the entity is described as one “whose experience 
doesn’t consist of subjective feels, tastes, colors . . . but rather of 
objective measurements of pressure,” if the entity is an “intelligent 
robot” (version B), then participants do not consider it an experiencer 
(question 7). On the other hand, if the entity is “another kind of 
intelligent creature (from a society much like ours)” (version A), then 
it is considered an experiencer. It is hard not to see this as evidence 
for a deep-seated intuition that artificial entities are categorically not 
experiencers. And importantly, this intuition doesn’t seemto be based 
on the absence/presence of a (sensory) qualitative aspect, since the 
non-human “intelligent creature” lacks the qualitative aspect as well 
and is still ranked as an experiencer. 
This “robot result” has immediate consequences for S&M’s 
approach. If there is at work in the folk something like a categorical 
understanding of such entities as non-experiencers, as there seems to 
be, this gives us independent reason to think that there is a 
systematically different sense of “seeing red” at work. S&M (2010, p. 
309) consider and reject an objection along these lines. The objection 
is that “seeing red is ambiguous,” that it may be used informationally 
or phenomenologically. S&M reject this (1) because it would be ad hoc 
without an explanation of the difference, and (2) because distributions 
of folk responses (almost all attributing “seeing red” or unsure) do not 
support the ambiguous understanding, because such an ambiguity 
would lead us to expect that responses would be evenly distributed. 
The results of this study, however, do offer an explanation of the 
ambiguity, namely, that the informational reading of “seeing red” is 
engaged in people when the entity under consideration is understood 
as not being an experiencer, and so S&M’s response (1) fails. As for 
response (2), if something systematic having to do with SIL is at work, 
then one would not expect a flat distribution of responses: the 
objection is not that the folk resolution of the ambiguity is “random,” 
but rather that it is dependent upon whether subjects understand the 
entity in question as being an experiencer.9 Thus the clustered 
response in favor of the attribution of seeing red is not unexpected. 
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S&M’s conclusion, that folk and philosophical conceptions of 
phenomenality differ, is confounded by the use of robots in their 
experiments. As I argue below, they are right that the conceptions 
differ, but not because the folk have no conception of phenomenality. 
Rather, folk phenomenality is importantly different from the 
philosophical sense in that it is grounded in the physical as opposed to 
the metaphysical nature of the experiencer. 
 
6.3. Unlinking Conscious Experience and Qualia 
 
That participants have a concept of some sense of qualia or 
“phenomenality” is clear from the results in part 2. Question 3 shows 
that the participants’ understanding of “seeing red” involves a 
component that cannot be verified from a third-person perspective. 
Such a private and ineffable component is typically a defining feature 
of qualia or “phenomenality.” The point, however, is that there must 
be “something it is like” to see red for it to be unverifiable. Further, 
question 6’s responses suggest that “seeing blue” involves a 
“qualitative aspect” or at least a constraint on “what it would be like” 
for a SIL-conscious entity in order for it to “see blue,” as opposed to 
detecting blue. In particular, a color blind person who has blue 
indicated in his/her visual field symbolically by 1’s does not “see blue.” 
As I argued above, it is unhelpful to think of phenomenality as a 
property of mental states in the way at work in S&M’s study, though 
understood as such, S&M are right that the folk don’t employ such 
phenomenality in their attributions of mental states. Nonetheless, 
something like phenomenality is required to explain the subjective and 
qualitative components brought out in questions 3 and 6. 
I suggest that we recognize the participants as employing a 
metaphysically thin concept of the qualitative character of conscious 
experience, rather than traditional phenomenality or qualia. To draw 
this out, distinguish between the qualitative and subjective characters 
of conscious experience. Following Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), 
notice that conscious experience has at least the following two 
aspects: a qualitative character and a “for-me” or subjective character. 
When I experience a clear blue sky, the experience has a q-character 
(qualitative) of “bluishness” and an s-character (subjective) of “being 
mine” in that intimate, first-person, subjective sense. Utilizing this 
distinction, we can understand SIL-consciousness, the question of 
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what makes an entity an experiencer in Nagel’s sense, as 
fundamentally about the s-character of conscious experience, and 
questions about the nature of qualitative (or “phenomenological”) 
states as fundamentally about the q-character. This is not to say that 
SIL-consciousness involves only the s-character, and that qualia 
involve only the q-character; empirical work will be required to decide 
this. I am suggesting only that SIL-consciousness is not conceptually 
equivalent to qualia, and that while SIL-consciousness may well be 
implicated in both the s-character and q-character, qualia is essentially 
about q-character and can, in principle, be empirically investigated 
independently of s-character. Precisely how SIL-consciousness and 
qualia are related in actual experiencers is an empirical question; 
indeed, work is being done in neuroscience that reinforces the 
distinction and sheds light on their relationship. Such work provides 
further empirical reason to doubt that SIL-consciousness and the 
qualitative character of subjective experience will turn out to be 
inseparable (much less identical) from a scientific perspective.10 
Invoking a q-character sense of “reddishness” or “bluishness” 
would explain the responses to questions 3 and 6: in the context of a 
SIL-conscious entity, the attribution of mental states such as “seeing 
red” involve a conception of the q-character of the experience. Having 
a q-character is the sense in which at least some mental state 
attributions to SIL-conscious agents involve “phenomenality. ”Many 
philosophers will be quick to make the jump from this q-character to 
qualia in the full-blown philosophical sense. But this move is not 
warranted here. The notion of “qualitative” invoked by the participants 
is different in at least two ways from the heavily metaphysical 
philosophical sense. 
The first difference is that the q-character is not thought of as 
necessary for being a SIL-conscious experiencer. In question 7, the 
results suggest that people find possible an entity whose experience 
does not consist of “subjective feels, tastes, colors, sounds, etc., but 
rather of objective measures.” And what is more, such an entity was 
considered an “experiencer,” so long as the entity was a naturally 
“intelligent creature” and not an “intelligent robot.” Recall that the 
intelligent robot was rated as possible, just not an experiencer. This 
possibility was further supported by question 9 in which participants 
ranked as an experiencer a person who had no qualitative senses, but 
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rather different sense modalities that “reported” directly to the speech 
recognition center. This sense of qualia is pointedly different from 
philosophical qualia, which are understood as necessary for being an 
experiencer and so closely linked to conscious experience that the 
problem of philosophical qualia is often taken to be identical to the 
problem of conscious experience. As we will see below, this has 
implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness. The second 
difference is that unlike philosophical qualia, the q-character invoked 
by the folk in the experiment is not “heavily” metaphysical in the 
sense of being thought of as something that could possibly be absent 
from the physical system of which it is a part. It was clear that in the 
way that participants were thinking of being an experiencer, it is not 
something that can be disconnected from the physical along the lines 
of zombie or other absent qualia examples (questions 1 and 8). If this 
is correct, then how the folk think about inner experience suggests 
that we should decide that zombies are not possible in the relevant 
sense. 
Finally, question 10 offers preliminary evidence that the folk do 
not have a readily awakened latent conception of qualia in the 
philosophical sense of something that may be severed from the 
physical system of which it is a part. Very few of the responses (7 of 
123) hinted at anything remotely like qualia or phenomenality shifting 
as a possible explanation for why the coffee taster is mixing up the 
two coffees. This further supports the claim that folk conceptions of 
the q-character of experience and philosophical qualia are quite 
different. 
 
6.4. Limitations 
 
The qualia considered here were primarily sensory, and 
generally not the other three standard qualitative kinds: bodily 
sensations; felt emotions; and felt moods. Question 7, with the 
intelligent creature/robot whose experience was objective, was the 
only attempt in the direction of qualia in a broader sense than sensory, 
but it would be rash to conclude too much from the fact that 
participants thought such an entity was possible and also an 
experiencer. Question 9, concerning the person with senses reporting 
sensory information in linguistic form directly to a speech center, 
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might be modified to include bodily, emotional, and mood information 
also being reported in linguistic form. 
A next step in exploring whether entities or states are more 
fundamental would be an experimental design that employed an 
inferential comparison of variance of subject responses to questions 
about relative amounts of qualia involved in various mental 
states and by various kinds of experiencers. If the majority of the 
variance in such an experiment were accounted for by the different 
experiencers as opposed to experiential states, this would further 
confirm the “trumping” role of the conception of experiencer over 
state. Such an experiment would be especially compelling because it 
would depend less on subject and experimenter interpretations.11 
Even if the results here are generalizable about sensory qualia, 
a question remains as to whether folk understandings of SIL-
experience must include at least some non-sensory qualitative 
features. In particular, our SIL-consciousness seems to have a 
qualitative “experiential tone” (Seager, 1999, p. 95) that is most 
noticeable, for example, when it becomes decidedly pleasant after a 
margarita or two. Is this “experiential tone” part of the q-aspect or the 
s-aspect of experience? As I have divided these two aspects of 
conscious experience, the s-aspect includes structural/functional 
properties like a unity, aspect/parts, temporal progression, present, 
past, and future, and relationships among its various experiential 
aspects (temporal, similarity, difference, identity, logical, rational, 
causal, etc.). But must it perhaps also include a global qualitative 
aspect like a general experiential tone? Moods, emotions, and mental 
states in general that are associated with affective valences have been 
shown to play an important, if unclear, role in attributing experience. 
My results bear this out. The results concerning the possibility of an 
experiencer without emotions hover right at “unsure” in terms of the 
mean, and the distribution’s high standard deviation make it clear that 
the issue divides people. Related to this, the non-emotional character 
Spock was the entity that was ranked closest to “unsure”; participants 
had a difficult time deciding the importance of emotions in “being an 
experiencer.” 
Among other things perhaps, what needs to be better 
understood is how and why emotions factor in so heavily for some 
non-philosophers. In particular, it is not clear how the folk understand 
emotions. It may even be that emotions are a crucial factor in 
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attributions of “experiencer,” and yet not in virtue of their qualitative 
aspect, but rather a moral or empathetic connection. And even if a 
qualitative aspect does turn out to be part of being an experiencer in 
the folk scheme, I have offered here another model and some 
preliminary evidence that such a concept is not the philosophers’ 
heavily metaphysical version. In any event, if the philosophical sense 
of sensory qualia are nonessential to our concept of “being an 
experiencer,” as this study suggests, then there is room to question 
the construal of the “hard problem” of consciousness as I take up 
below.12 
 
6.5. The “Hard Problem” and Folk Phenomenality 
 
The “hard problem” of consciousness is directly implicated in the 
question of what is clearly and intuitively true of experience. 
Philosophers from Block to Churchland and from Dennett to Goldman 
assume that philosophical and folk conceptions of subjective 
experience are the same, and if this is not the case, philosophers may 
well have been inventing rather than solving puzzles about subjective 
experience. In particular, the “hard problem” (Chalmers) and perhaps 
even the “explanatory gap” (Levine) depend on an understanding of 
subjective experience that includes a metaphysically robust qualitative 
component, one that is not present in the folk conception of subjective 
experience, if these results are correct. 
While S&M and I both find reason to reject the assumptions that 
give rise to the “hard problem,” it is worth examining our distinct 
details. S&M argue that experimental studies of attribution behavior 
show that there are not any second-order phenomenological properties 
that apply to all the mental states that philosophers normally consider 
as having phenomenological properties. As such, their case depends 
on a critical auxiliary assumption, namely, that all the different mental 
states considered by philosophers to be phenomenological (sensory 
states, bodily position/state awareness, feelings, emotions, and 
moods) have sufficiently uniform presuppositions and other application 
conditions, and that one may test the question by examining how the 
folk attribute these across modalities (seeing red, feeling pain, etc.) 
and across subject types (humans and robots). As I have argued 
above, my findings do not support this. I found reason to believe that 
the folk have systematically different conceptions of these kinds of 
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states, that they have deeply distinct presuppositions about “artificial” 
experiencers, and that some of their mental state attributions 
concerning subjective experience do involve a “phenomenological” 
(qualitative) aspect. 
Nonetheless, I agree with S&M that findings like these should 
give one pause about whether there is a “hard problem” or 
unbridgeable explanatory gap. If correct, my results suggest that the 
folk sense of being an experiencer does not depend on traditional 
qualia, that is, on the kind that (by definition) is left over after all 
functional properties of the brain/body system are explained. Call this 
traditional sense “m-qualia” (metaphysical), as it is the kind that can 
be conceived of as separable from the physical system composing an 
experiencer. The folk appear to employ a distinct conception of the 
qualitative character of experience. Call it “p-qualia” (for “physical” or 
“pholk”), and it has some of the properties of m-qualia: it is qualitative 
in that it concerns how the experience “actually appears/feels” to the 
subject, it is private/perspectival, and it is practically ineffable. But p-
qualia are still ultimately tied to the physical. Hence, p-qualia are not 
the sort that “hard problem” arguments need to get off the ground. In 
fact, p-qualia are rather similar to Dennett’s (1988) replacement for 
the m-qualia he attempted to “Quine.”13 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
The picture of subjective experience that begins to emerge from 
this study falls somewhere between the accounts offered by “hard 
problem” philosophers and S&M’s position that the folk conception 
lacks a phenomenological component. People have a concept of an 
experiencer in the SIL-sense that they apply readily to humans and 
some other animals. Whether this concept is at play helps fix whether 
(some) mental state attributions have a folk qualitative component. 
The features of the folk conception of subjective experience that 
emerge support viewing the SIL-consciousness of a subject as a 
holistic notion that does not a priori reduce to the set of mental states 
with phenomenological properties and that includes a metaphysically 
thin sense of the qualitative aspect of experience. 
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Notes 
 
[1] I note also Huebner’s (2010) work, which is in conversation with S&M 
(2010) and much of the literature of the previous paragraph. 
[2] Buckwalter and Phelan (forthcoming) offer a distinct challenge to parts of 
S&M (2010), primarily their positive (valence) hypothesis about what 
underlies folk attribution of subjective experience. 
[3] The particular FDR method used was the BY method from Benjamini and 
Yekutieli (2001). 
[4] Gray and Weger use the term ‘experience-less’ for such people and 
characterize them as unable to “feel pain, pleasure or fear or 
otherwise experience what a normal person can experience” (2012, p. 
128); the persons in a coma and under general anesthesia in this 
study certainly qualify “experience-less” in this sense. 
[5] Following S&M (2010, p. 312, note 13), this tests whether variations like 
“S is angry” versus “S feels angry” make a difference specifically for 
attributions of affective states. See S&M (2009) for further discussion 
of such differences. 
[6] It is a limitation of this study that the order of the questions in parts 1 
and 2 was not counterbalanced to control for framing effects. 
[7] In general, such demand bias is poorly understood; see McCambridge, de 
Bruin, and Witton (2012) for a recent survey of literature on demand 
characteristic bias in non-laboratory settings. They suggest, among 
other things, that such bias is not well understood and appears to be 
heavily context dependent, and that “unqualified use of the term 
demand characteristics is not only questionable but should be 
abandoned” (2012, concluding paragraph). 
[8] My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
[9] An anonymous reviewer has made the plausible suggestion that S&M’s 
position is actually that the distribution would be bimodal, though they 
do not say so explicitly. Even so, the bimodal prediction would still be 
trumped by the systemic starting assumption that the robot is not an 
experiencer that triggers the informational sense of “seeing.” 
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[10] The Integrated Information account of consciousness is an example of 
this; see Tononi (2008), Balduzi and Tononi (2008), and Boly, 
Massimini, and Tononi (2009). 
[11] I owe thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
[12] Another potential limitation is that 75% of the participants indicated that 
they believed in God and 60% that they are religious. As Gray, 
Knickman, and Wegner (2011) have documented, belief in a 
soul/afterlife affects one’s willingness to attribute mentality in cases 
outside normally functioning human beings (in their case persistent 
vegetative patients). More work is needed with nonbelievers and 
“different believers,” e.g., “non-Western.” 
[13] Dennett proposes PIP (phenomenal information property) detectors, 
following Peter Bieri and Fred Dretske. His provocative suggestion 
meshes rather well with a recent prominent scientific account of 
consciousness and qualia, the Integrated Information account; see 
Tononi (2008) and Peressini (2013) for a philosophical discussion. 
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Table 1 Part 1 means and t-tests comparing means to the 
“unsure” answer of 4. The significance of the t-tests are 
indicated with asterisks as: *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, and ***p , 
0.001. 
 
 
Figure 1 Part 1 means with error bars indicating 99% 
confidence interval. 
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Table 2 Part 1 pair-wise mean comparisons. The subsets are 
generated by FDR pair-wise comparisons using the BY method 
from Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) in which the null hypothesis 
of equal means is not rejected. Means listed in columns. 
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Table 3 Part 1 Principle Component Analysis Matrix with 
communalities. The rotated method was Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. Values are shown for significant loadings (jxj $ 
0.5); salient loadings (0.4 # jxj , 0.5) are indicated by “*”; 
marginal loadings (0.3 # jxj , 0.4) are indicated by “-”; zero 
loadings (jxj , 0.3) are left blank. 
 
 
Table 4 Part 2 means and t-tests comparing means to the 
“unsure” answer of 4. The significance of the t-tests are 
indicated with asterisks as: *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, and ***p , 
0.001. 
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Figure 2 Part 2 (single version questions) means with error bars 
indicating 99% confidence interval. 
 
 
Figure 3 Part 2 (multiple version questions) means with error 
bars indicating 99% confidence interval. 
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Table 5 Part 2, question 10 (subjective experience shift) 
explanation types with number and percentage of total (N ¼ 
123). 
 
 
Figure 4 Part 2, question 10 (subjective experience shift) 
explanation types with number and percentage of total (N ¼ 
123). 
 
 
 
